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Abstract  
Elections play a crucial role in political stability in post-democratization, and 
electoral administrations are the key to the electoral process. However, not all newly 
democratized countries have established reliable electoral administration. New 
democracies in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, 
have independent election commissions which have different characteristics, 
especially in terms of neutrality. Based on three cases, this paper claims that the 
stakes of politics are the major determinant of the variations in neutrality. The high 
stakes of politics in Thailand brought about the partisan election commission, while 
the low stakes in Indonesia made the electoral system relatively neutral. Like 
Thailand, the high stakes of politics in the Philippines also cause political 
intervention in the electoral administration.  
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1. Introduction 
 
How to make elections fair is a crucial issue in democratic consolidation. When political 
competitions are not fair, major political players seek to deviate from political 
institutions. This brings about instability. The key to holding fair elections is neutrality 
(being non-partisan) and capacity for electoral administration.1 Nevertheless, newly 
democratized countries do not necessarily have neutral and capable electoral 
administrations. In particular, the degree of neutrality in electoral administration varies 
among countries, even if they have independent election commissions. What prevents 
an electoral administration from being neutral in newly democratized countries? 
Focusing on three new democracies in Southeast Asia, this paper seeks to answer this 
question. 
 
Theoretically, it has been argued that the nature of electoral administration is determined 
by strategic interactions between competing political players. Especially, the size of the 
power which is obtained by the winner of the competitions (the stakes of politics) and 
the degree of the opposition’s protest against electoral manipulation decide the payoff 
structure of the game of establishing electoral administration (Przeworski 1991, 
Magaloni 2010). The high stakes of politics provide the incentive to grab the power 
regardless of the means. The ruler then has less interest in establishing a neutral 
electoral administration. On the other hand, the high probability of strong protest from 
the opposition increases the cost of oppression. This discourages the ruler from rigging 
elections. The degree of the opposition’s protest depends on their resources (funds and 
membership) as well as the seriousness of coordination problems among them.  
 
The cases of three Southeast Asian democracies (the Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia) indicate the significance of the stakes of politics in determining the nature of 
electoral administrators.2 The high stakes of politics intensify electoral competitions and 
                                                 
1 We define “electoral administration” as the system of election management. An 
election commission is a part of the system. Moreover, organizations other than an 
election commission play decisive roles in some countries such as Indonesia. We also 
consider such entities as a part of electoral administrations.  
2 When the author was conducting research in 2013, Thailand was still a democratic 
country. As of 2015, Thailand is under military rule, and apparently non-democratic. 
Nevertheless, Thailand established an independent election commission in 1997, and it 
suggests significant implications in assessing the relations between the stakes of politics 
and the neutrality of electoral administration. Hence, we include the case of Thailand 
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decreases the probability that fair elections will be held. The 1997 Thai Constitution 
raised the stakes of politics by adopting majoritarian-type political institutions. Under 
this institutional setting, the election commission took partisan actions. The high stakes 
of politics in the Philippines, where political control provides large economic rents, also 
intensify the competition and make the electoral administration vulnerable to political 
intervention. In contrast, the election commission in Indonesia shows non-partisanship 
under consensus-type political institutions. However, as for the probability of protests 
against electoral manipulation, we have not confirmed a clear influence on the nature of 
electoral administration.  
 
In the following section, we review the theoretical framework. Then, we investigate the 
effects of the stakes of politics by examining the cases of the Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia.  
 
 
2. Determinants of Electoral Administration 
 
The simplest criterion to classify electoral administrations is whether or not an 
independent election commission is established (Onishi 2013). However, external 
independence is not necessarily equivalent to substantive independence. We need to 
look at the degree of the substantive independence of election commissions in order to 
reveal its impacts on the electoral process.3  
 
We find two possible explanations for the nature of election commissions. One is their 
historical paths. In this case, the initial type of electoral administration is seen to 
determine the type in the next period. The other possible explanation is the strategic 
interactions of the political players. In this case, the nature of electoral administration is 
perceived as the result of their interactions.  
 
The logic of each is different, but they do not contradict each other. Even if we regard 
historical paths as important, the payoff calculations of major players and their strategic 
interactions affect the evolutionary process of institutions. Likewise, even if we 
emphasize the strategic interactions as a key determinant, the payoffs of players are 
                                                                                                                                               
(1997-2014) in our discussion.  
3 “Neutrality,” “independence” and “autonomy” are interchangeable in this paper.   
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determined in historical context. This paper focuses on the strategic interactions of 
political players as a major determinant of electoral administration. Nonetheless, we 
place the interactions in historical context (Kawanaka and Asaba 2013, Soga 2013). 
 
To construct the logic of interactions, we assume that each player prefers the type of 
electoral administration which enables it to win the elections. The first player who can 
determine the substantive nature of electoral administration is the one who holds power. 
Hence, this process is considered as the institutional choice of the player sitting in a 
powerful position, in short, the ruler. The ruler is expected to prefer a situation in which 
he can intervene in the electoral process to obtain favorable results. Nonetheless, blatant 
manipulation of elections causes negative repercussions from the citizens. Therefore, as 
long as the cost caused by the protest exceeds the benefits of holding power, the ruler 
has an incentive to establish a neutral electoral administration to maintain the fairness of 
the elections.4 This means keeping the commitment of the ruler to hold fair elections 
credible by means of binding his/her own hands so that he/she cannot intervene in 
elections. The costs are minimized if the opposition’s protest is avoided (Magaloni 
2010). Moreover, the higher the probability of the ruler’s victory, the stronger the ruler’s 
incentive to establish an independent electoral administration. As long as the ruler is 
certain about his/her victory, a neutral electoral administration does not harm his/her 
payoff.5 Nonetheless, if the stakes of power exceed the cost of negative repercussions 
caused by manipulation, the ruler loses the incentive to establish a neutral electoral 
administration.  
 
In sum, if we survey previous works, the factors which determine the nature of electoral 
administration are: 
(1) The stakes of politics 
(2) The expected intensity of protest against manipulation 
 
Przeworski (1991) emphasizes the stakes of politics in democratic stability. Although it 
is not easy to operationalize the stakes of power, the number of veto players could be a 
                                                 
4 We also need to consider the cost of electoral fraud itself, such as the use of funds for 
vote buying.  
5 However, some claim that the invincibility of the ruling party through dominance of 
the elections would make its authoritarian rule firm. If a ruler would like to have 
formidable dominance that exceeds a mere majority, the ruler would still have an 
incentive to rig elections (Magaloni 2006, Simpser 2013). 
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possible measurement (Tsebelis 2002).6 The more veto players exist, the lower the 
stakes of power become. Political institutions such as executive-legislative relations and 
the party system determine the number of veto players. On the other hand, the expected 
intensity of the protest is determined by two factors. One is how many political 
resources the opposition has. Political resources consist mainly of the funds and the 
people whom the opposition can mobilize. Another is the seriousness of the 
coordination problem within the opposition (Weingast 1997). The level of the 
coordination problem is decided by the situation of social cleavages and how such 
cleavages are connected to political groups.  
 
However, we have a problem in dealing with these two factors simultaneously because 
the high stakes of politics and the expected intensity of protest against manipulation 
seem to correlate. Strong protests actually indicate the intensity of competition, which is 
raised by the stakes of politics. In fact, Southeast Asian cases show the correlation. The 
stakes of politics and the opposition’s protest of the incumbent are both high in Thailand 
and the Philippines, while both are relatively low in Indonesia.  
 
In addition, we need to be careful about the significance of the information. The players 
usually have clear information about the former, but not about the latter. The stakes of 
politics are mainly determined by political institutions which are specific and stable. On 
the other hand, protests exist in a fluid situation. The citizens’ support quickly changes. 
There is also internal competition within the opposition. At the time of elections, the 
players tend to calculate their payoffs based on clear information about the stakes of 
politics rather than the uncertain post-electoral protests. 
 
For these reasons, this paper asserts that the stakes of politics matter more than the 
expected intensity of protest as determinant of the nature of electoral administration.   
 
 
3. Southeast Asia 
 
Except for Brunei, all Southeast Asian countries hold regular elections. Among them, 
                                                 
6 It is relatively easy to measure the power of presidents (Shugart and Carey 1992). 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to compare the power of chief executives, including both 
prime ministers and presidents. The number of veto player mitigates the difficulty of 
measurement caused by the difference of government forms. 
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the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have been holding relatively free elections. 
They underwent democratization from the 1980s to the 1990s. The Philippines was 
democratized in 1986, while Indonesia was in 1998. Although coups have been repeated 
in Thailand, the fall of the Suchinda Administration in 1992 was a turning point for 
Thailand’s democratic institutions. The 1997 Constitution, though amended after the 
coups, provided the democratic foundation in the country until 2014 (Thailand resumed 
military rule after the 2014 coup). 
 
These three countries have independent election commissions provided by their 
constitutions. However, the levels of neutrality and capacity vary among them. The 
Commission on Elections of the Philippines (Comlec) does not enjoy strong autonomy 
free from political pressure and has some problems in regulating the electoral process. 
As a result, the electoral administration partially relies on civic organizations. The 
Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has strong regulatory power, including 
suspension of candidacy and nullification of the electoral process. At the same, it has 
been taking partisan actions. The General Election Commission in Indonesia (Komisi 
Pemelihan Umum (KPU)) has some weaknesses in managing elections. However, it 
maintains relatively high neutrality.  
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Table 1 Scores of Polity IV and Freedom House for Asian Countries 
Country Polity IV (2013)1 Freedom in the World (2014)2 
Freedom3 Electoral 
Democracy4 
Electoral 
Process5 
Japan 10 Free ○ 12 
China -7 Not Free --- 0 
Korea 8 Free ○ 11 
Taiwan 10 Free ○ 11 
Mongol 10 Free ○ 11 
The Philippines 8 Partly Free ○ 9 
Indonesia 8 Partly Free ○ 11 
Thailand 7 Partly Free ○ 8 
Malaysia 6 Partly Free --- 6 
Singapore -2 Partly Free --- 4 
Cambodia 2 Not Free --- 3 
Laos -7 Not Free --- 0 
Vietnam -7 Not Free --- 0 
Myanmar -3 Not Free --- 3 
India 9 Free ○ 11 
Bangladesh 4 Partly Free ○ 9 
Pakistan 7 Partly Free --- 7 
Sri Lanka 4 Partly Free --- 6 
Nepal 6 Partly Free --- 8 
Notes: 1. The most autocratic regime receives -10, while the most democratic regime receives 10. 
      2. As of 2013 
      3. Based on scores for political rights and civil liberties 
4. Countries which have a certain level of electoral process score belong to electoral democracies. 
  5. Based on the nature of national elections and electoral institutions. The highest score is “12” 
which indicates the most fair. 
Source: Compiled by the author from Polity IV http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
and Freedomhouse http://www.freedomhouse.org/. 
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Various indicators imply the nature of electoral administrations in three countries. The 
Electoral Process Score of Freedom House shows the chronological changes as 
indicated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Changes in Electoral Process Scores in the Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia 
 
Source: Compiled by the author, based on the data of Freedom House.  
 
“0” indicates the worst quality of elections, while “12” indicates the highest quality. The 
criteria of the Electoral Process Score are based on three following questions: 
 
1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and 
fair elections? 
2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair?7 
 
The third question which addresses the nature of electoral administration though the 
Electoral Process Score itself is not limited to measuring the neutrality or capacity of 
the electoral process. Since the fairness of elections is mostly determined by the 
neutrality and capacity of electoral administration, the score can be a proxy for the 
nature of electoral administrations.  
                                                 
7 https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology#.UuBEBLQo
71I 
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When we take a look at the Electoral Process Score, it has been consistently high in 
Indonesia since 2005. The score significantly plunged in Thailand in 2006. This was 
caused by a coup and the subsequent administration change. The level has continued to 
rise since then, though it is still low. In sum, the electoral administration in Indonesia 
seems to be higher quality, followed by that in the Philippines, and then that in 
Thailand. 
 
Aside from the Freedom House score, Norris, Martinez i Coma, and Frank (2014) and 
Kelley (2011) provide data on the quality of elections. Their datasets contain the score 
for the neutrality and capacity of election commissions.  
 
Table 2 Election Commissions of Three Countries 
 Neutrality of election 
administration
（impartial）* 
Complaints about electoral 
commission conduct on 
election day (R224R) ** 
The Philippines 3 0.67 
Thailand n.a. 1.00 
Indonesia 3.42 0.4 
Average of all 
countries 
3.25 
(N=76, Polity2>-6) 
0.39 
(N=101, Polity2>-6) 
* Norris, Martinez i Coma, and Frank (2014). Code: Strongly Disagree, 1; Disagree, 2; Neither agree 
nor disagree, 3; Agree, 4; Strongly Agree, 5.   
** Kelley (2011). Average of evaluations of various organizations. Code: Good - no problems, 0; 
Low - minor problems only, 1; Moderate - moderate problems, 2; High - major problems, 3. 
Source: Author. 
 
Indonesia achieves a relatively better score for its election commission, followed by the 
Philippines and then Thailand. These evaluations match the Electoral Process Score of 
Freedom House. 
 
In order to check the correlations between the Electoral Process Score and the stakes of 
politics, we plot countries in Figure 2, with the Electoral Process Score on the vertical 
axis and the Check and Balances Score (the Number of Veto Players) of the World 
Bank’s Dataset of Political Institutions (DPI) on the horizontal axis (Keefer 2012).  
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Figure 2 Electoral Process Score and the Number of Veto Players (2009) 
 
N = 174, r = 0.52 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
It is predicted that, theoretically, a larger number of veto players bring about a better 
score for the Electoral Process because a larger number of veto players means a lower 
concentration of power. As a whole, Figure 2 shows the predicted trend. Furthermore, 
the positions of the three Southeast Asian countries do not contradict the theoretical 
prediction, though they do not fit the prediction perfectly.  
 
In addition, if we compare the presidential powers particularly between the Philippines 
and Indonesia based on Kasuya (2013), the President of the Philippines has greater 
power. This fits the theoretical prediction, combined with the number of veto players. 
 
Meanwhile, we also check the correlations between the Electoral Process Score and the 
seriousness of the coordination problem within the opposition in Figure 3. We use the 
Opposition Fractionalization Index of the World Bank’s DPI here.8  
                                                 
8 The Opposition Fractionalization Index indicates the probability that two deputies 
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Figure 3  Electoral Process Score and Opposition Fractionalization (2009) 
 
N=153, r = -0.02 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
Unlike Figure 2, Figure 3 does not show any correlation. If we follow the previous 
arguments, it is supposed that larger opposition fractionalization decreases the Electoral 
Process Score because it is more difficult to solve the coordination problem. However, 
we cannot find any correlation between the two variables. This does not necessarily 
support our argument of the correlation between the stakes of politics and the intensity 
of protest, or the argument on the information. Nonetheless, at least it indicates that the 
costs of facing protests are not an apparent cause for the establishment of neutral 
electoral administration in democracies.  
 
In the following sections, we will examine the effects of the stakes of power through 
case studies on three countries. The three cases could be summed up as follows. 
 
In the Philippines, Comelec or members of Comelec are often blamed for being partisan. 
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This is mainly caused by the high stakes of politics, particularly control over rents. 
Nevertheless, prohibition of reelection of the president weakens the president’s 
incentive to intervene in elections except for the midterm elections. In another aspect, 
the presidential term limit discourages the president from conducting serious electoral 
reforms because it has nothing to do with the interests of an incumbent who steps down 
after a single term. In addition, local political competitions seem to be a major cause of 
political intervention as the stakes of politics is so high at the local level.  
 
In Thailand, partisanship in the ECT has been caused by the concentration of power, 
especially after the approval of the 1997 Constitution which adopted a majoritarian 
system and strengthened the prime minister’s status9. The ECT was established as an 
independent body and given strong regulatory power. This made the ECT itself a 
political player.  
 
In Indonesia, the KPU is relatively neutral, though its capability is sometimes 
questioned. The stakes of power are relatively low as Indonesia has consensus-type 
political institutions with an institutionalized multi-party system. In addition, the 
relatively weakness of the president’s power lowers the stakes of politics (Kasuya 2013, 
Kawamura 2013).  
 
 
4. The Philippines 
 
Since the constitution prohibits reelection of the president, the president does not have 
an incentive to manipulate electoral administration in order to get reelected.10 The 
president does not have a strong incentive to help his/her party members win the 
presidential election either since political parties are fluid in the Philippines. Elections 
are competitions between individual politicians rather than parties. However, the term 
limit does not necessarily work to promote the neutrality of Comelec. Actually, single 
term presidency discourages the president’s serious reform of electoral administration 
because the result of the presidential election after his term ends does not affect his own 
                                                 
9 See Hicken (2009) for the effects of the 1997 Constitution.  
10 The 2004 presidential election was an exception because the incumbent president, 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was allowed to run. As vice president, she assumed 
the presidency after her predecessor, President Joseph Estrada, stepped down in the 
middle of his term. In such cases, the Constitution allows the incumbent to run.  
11 
 
political life. Since the authoritarian Marcos regime utilized Comelec as a part of its 
authoritarian institutions and such a historical background has influenced the nature of 
Comelec even after democratization, the lack of serious reforms causes Comelec’s 
problems to continue.  
 
In addition, the president still has an incentive to intervene in the midterm elections as 
the results affect the president’s legislative agenda. Furthermore, local politics matter in 
determining the nature of Comelec. Local elections are competitions between local 
politicians to gain the control over the various interests in respective areas (McCoy 
1993, Sidel 1999). The stakes of power in local politics are quite high, and so local 
politicians have strong incentives to manipulate the electoral administration. 
 
If we take a look at the expected intensity of protests, the opposition’s protest can be 
controlled by the ruler at the national level. Since the party system is fluid, members of 
the opposition can be bought off. They can even join the winner’s party after the 
elections, even if they were once members of the rival parties. 11  The street 
demonstration against the Estrada Administration in 2001 seems to be an exception in 
this sense. The protest movement removed President Joseph Estrada from office, and 
this indicates that the people’s extra-constitutional actions can threaten the 
administration. However, it was not based on electoral fraud but on apprehension over 
economic stagnation. His successor, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was able to 
survive the protest movement against her in 2005 prompted by her election rigging. In 
contrast, electoral fraud in local elections often causes intensified conflicts. Rivals of the 
winners often stage strong protests against electoral fraud when it occurs. Still, such 
protests do not discourage electoral fraudulence since the power provides the winner 
with large rents.  
 
The evolution of the electoral administration in the Philippines was as follows, within 
the above-mentioned incentive structure.  
 
The electoral administration was initially established under American colonial rule, and 
elections were administered by the Ministry of Interior in the beginning. The 
independent commission, Comelec, was established by the 1935 Constitution. Comelec 
                                                 
11 The majority bloc in the lower house, which is usually close to the president, kept 
around 80 percent of the total seats after democratization (Kawamura 2012). This was 
mainly in the form of a post-election coalition. 
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was strengthened after independence in 1946. By the 1973 Constitution under the 
authoritarian Marcos regime, Comelec was expanded and acquired a semi-judicial 
function in addition to its management function. Such consolidation worked for the 
Marcos regime, enabling it to manipulate the electoral process. Under the authoritarian 
rule, there were congressional elections twice (1978 and 1984) and presidential 
elections twice (1981 and 1986). In all the elections, President Marcos or his party won. 
Cases of massive electoral fraud (disenfranchisement, manipulation of counting, vote 
buying and violent intimidation) were observed.12 The most infamous case was the 
1986 presidential election when Corazon Aquino, wife of assassinated Senator Benigno 
Aquino, Jr., ran against President Marcos. Some Comelec officials even walked out to 
protest the counting manipulation (Wurfel 1988, p. 300). Although the National 
Assembly declared that President Marcos won, it triggered a military coup and mass 
demonstration. Eventually, the authoritarian regime collapsed.  
 
Politicians’ intervention in Comelec, which was enhanced under the Marcos 
administration, continued to exist even after democratization. Calimbahin (2009) points 
out three major problems with Comelec. First, political and economic elites and 
members of Comelec are in a patron-client relationship which allows those elites to 
interfere. Second, there exist patron-client networks within Comelec which promote 
private interests in official business. Third, Comelec itself suffers from inefficiency and 
incapability. Calimbahin claims that these characteristics were formed before 
democratization. 
 
The intensity of politicians’ intervention can be translated as the level of corruption in 
Comelec. Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), reports that Comelec had a bad 
reputation regarding corruption as of 2006. Although it improved in 2009, its bad 
reputation (i.e., Comelec is not sincere) still exceeded its good reputation (i.e., Comelec 
is sincere) by 8 points.13  
 
The holding of fair elections was one of the major issues in the Philippines, as in other 
democratized countries. Drastic reforms in Comelec were also expected after 
                                                 
12 In the pre-authoritarian period, Comelec contributed to fair elections, such as the 
elections of the 1970 Constitutional Convention (Wurfel 1988, pp.105-106). 
13  2008 Survey of Enterprises on Corruption: Anti-corruption sincerity ratings 
improved for only 8 out of 30 agencies; Transparent Accountable Governance: The 
2009 SWS Surveys on Corruption. 
13 
 
democratization. However, instead of reforms in Comelec, endeavors to achieve fair 
elections were mainly carried out through integrating the private sector into the electoral 
process.  
 
The private sector’s involvement in the electoral process can be traced back to the time 
of the democratic period just after independence. Violent intimidation and vote buying 
were rampant then. In order to support Comelec, the National Movement for Free 
Elections (NAMFREL) was established in 1951. Although it aimed to maintain fairness 
in elections, it was manipulated by the US government to cause Ramon Magsaysay to 
win the 1953 presidential election (Wurfel 1988, pp.104-105). A new NAMFREL was 
organized for the 1984 national assembly (Batasan Pambansa) elections. It was in 
charge of counting at the precinct level, independent of Comelec’s counting.14 President 
Marcos officially allowed civic groups to monitor the electoral process in order to 
trumpet his administration’s legitimacy. The 1985 Omnibus Election Code of the 
Philippines formally provided for the monitoring of civic groups. Discrepancies in 
counting between Comelec and NAMFREL made people doubt the fairness of the 
elections, and this eventually augmented the legitimacy of the Aquino government after 
democratization. The 1995 amendment to the 1991 Synchronized Election Code 
provides that a copy of election returns shall be given to a civic group.   
 
While the private sector increased its presence, there were also attempts to reform 
Comelec itself, especially under the Aquino Administration. President Aquino appointed 
lawyers who were known for their integrity such as Hilario Davide, Jr., Haydee Yorak, 
and Christian Monsod as Comelec chairs. However, Davide and Yorac were transferred 
to other institutions shortly, and Monsod’s term was short as he was appointed just to 
finish his predecessors’ term (Calimbahin 2009).  
 
In the 1995 senatorial elections just after Monsod retired, manipulation of counting as 
well as other kinds of electoral fraud were reported. Also, the presidents appointed 
people who were perceived as partisan as Comelec chairs.  
 
Comelec is composed of seven commissioners with terms of seven years. No 
reappointment is allowed. Commissioners are required to be members of the bar and 
                                                 
14 The name was slightly changed. The new NAMFREL is the National Citizen’s 
Movement for Free Elections.  
14 
 
should have practiced more than ten years. The consent of the Commission on 
Appointments composed of selected senators and representatives is also necessary for 
their appointments. Despite these requirements, the president influences the selection 
since he/she holds the decisive power to appoint.15  
 
Reforming Comelec has been a tough task. Therefore, the introduction in 2010 of an 
automated counting system that aims to prevent counting manipulation was a 
breakthrough in its history. Although there is still room for vote buying and intimidation, 
automated counting is expected to be effective for improving the quality of elections.16 
The SWS surveys indicate that 54 percent of respondents were satisfied with the 2004 
elections (35 percent were not satisfied) and 51 percent were satisfied with the 2007 
elections (31 percent were not satisfied). After automation was introduced, the 
satisfaction rate increased to 75 percent in the 2010 elections (15 percent were not 
satisfied).17  
 
 
5. Thailand 
 
Thailand has experienced neither an enduring democracy nor an enduring authoritarian 
regime. Thai people had 15 constitutions from the first constitution after the 1932 
revolution up to the 1997 Constitution. Although general elections were held 19 times 
during this period (Kokpol 2002), coups were repeatedly launched. In short, Thai 
politics has been very unstable, swinging between democracy and military rule. The 
electoral system before 1997 was bloc voting, where one district has several seats. The 
electoral administration was under the Ministry of Interior at that time. 
 
The 1992 democratization, which was triggered by a bloody confrontation, produced a 
new type of constitution. The 1997 Constitution was different from the previous 
constitutions in many respects. First, it provided for an independent election 
commission. Second, it introduced majoritarian-type political institutions. This raised 
                                                 
15  For example, controversial appointments include Luzviminda Tancangco (by 
President Estrada) and Benjamin Abalos and Virgilio Garcilliano (by President Arroyo). 
16 The Center for People Empowerment in Governance (n.d.) claims that there are still 
some problems in transparency.   
17 Social Weather Stations. 2010. Second Quarter 2010 Social Weather Survey: 75% of 
Filipinos satisfied with the conduct of the May 2010 Elections. 
15 
 
the stakes of politics, and it eventually brought about the partisanship of the Election 
Commission of Thailand (ECT).  
 
The majoritarian feature was mainly caused by the plurality (single member district) 
electoral system.18 In addition, the power of the prime minister was strengthened by two 
changes. First, the member of the parliament who is appointed to a Cabinet post loses 
his/her seat in the parliament. This discourages the cabinet member from rebelling 
against the prime minister because he/she has no place to return. Second, those who 
joined an accredited political party less than 90 days before the elections cannot run for 
the elections. Since elections must be held within 60 days from the dissolution of 
parliament, politicians cannot switch their affiliation after the dissolution. The prime 
minister can threaten those who seek to defect from the ruling party by dissolving the 
parliament (Hicken 2009, p.132).  
 
Along with the political reform, the electoral administration was also separated from the 
Ministry of Interior. It was perceived then that the administration or the bureaucracy 
could influence the electoral process as long as the electoral administration was under 
the Ministry. The independent commission was established to preclude such a 
problem.19  
 
The newly established ECT acquired greater power than the Ministry of Interior had 
before. Cases of violation of electoral rules used to be handled by the court, and 
proceedings tended to take a long time. In many cases, prosecutors could not sustain 
trials as they lacked of sufficient evidence.20 The 1997 Constitution gave the ECT the 
power to investigate violations of electoral rules. Moreover, the ECT can suspend the 
candidacies and accreditation of parties and nullify results where electoral rules are 
violated. In particular, the 2000 amendments to the Organic Law on the Elections gave 
the ECT the power to nullify the results and hold a second round of elections at the 
precinct level if the ECT recognizes electoral fraud in the precinct (yellow cards). 
                                                 
18 Proportional representation was also introduced, but single member districts were 
allotted more seats in the parliament.  
19  Interview with Laddawan Tantivitayapitak (Vice Chairwoman of Political 
Development Council), September 7, 2011. She finds no strong opposition from the 
Ministry of Interior for the separation.  
20 Most of the electoral fraud in Thailand is vote buying (Klein 1998). It is widely 
known that the networks of local politicians and “hua khanaen,” or brokers, play a 
crucial role in Thai elections (Ockey 2004). 
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Candidates who are suspected of violating electoral rules are not allowed to run in the 
second round of elections or in any elections within one year (red cards). Only one red 
card was issued in the 2000 senatorial elections. However, the ECT ordered 62 precincts 
to repeat elections. Then, it issued 52 red cards in the 2001 parliamentary elections 
(Kokpol 2002).21 
 
The majoritarian-type political institutions of the 1997 Constitution were introduced to 
get rid of the problems caused by the previous bloc voting system. Political parties used 
to be loosely structured, and they depended on factions of local politicians. The prime 
minister’s leadership was weak because he/she needed to have coalitional partners to 
sustain the administration. The new political institutions brought about the strong 
leadership of the prime minister. In the 2001 parliamentary elections, Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT), the party established by Thaksin Shinawatra, gained almost half of the seats and 
organized its administration after absorbing small parties. In the 2005 elections, TRT 
occupied three-fourthsof the parliament.  
 
The landslide victory of TRT intensified the conflict between the urban middle class 
who were weary of corruption scandals in the administration and rural farmers who 
supported Thaksin’s distributive policy to the rural areas. The military, supported by the 
urban middle class, launched a coup and expelled Thaksin in 2006. Since then, the 
pro-Thaksin Red Shirts group and the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts group continue to 
clash and deepen the social cleavage.  
 
As the stakes of politics increased due to concentration of power and political groupings 
became polarized, the ECT’s strong power attracted intervention. The members of the 
ECT were initially composed of bureaucrats (the Ministry of Interior), judges, 
university professors, and NGO workers. As the crucial role of the ECT was recognized 
through elections, especially after the 2001 elections, Prime Minister Thaksin started 
placing the members who were close to him in the commission (Chambers 2006). 
Therefore, the 2005 elections in which TRT won a landslide victory were administered 
under the pro-Thaksin commission (Croissant and Pojar 2005).22   
 
                                                 
21 As for the 2000 senatorial elections and the 2001 parliamentary elections, see 
(Institute of Developing Economies (various years), Montesano (2001), 2002)). 
22 It is also reported that politicians and bureaucrats intervened in the ECT at the local 
level (Achakorn Wongpreedee 2007, Nelson 2008). 
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The partisanship of the ECT intensified the struggle over the control of the ECT. 
Although TRT won the 2005 elections, the urban middle class started protesting against 
the administration after various scandals were revealed. In order to augment his 
legitimacy, Prime Minister Thaksin held parliamentary elections in 2006. Because the 
election results were not finalized in some areas, the Thaksin administration tried to 
hold elections again. However, the Constitutional Court announced that the 2006 
elections were void due to mismanagement by the ECT and asked the ECT 
commissioners to resign. After the commissioners refused to resign, they were 
prosecuted for their alleged illegal favors to TRT members. All of them were convicted 
and removed from office. The military then launched a coup, and Prime Minister 
Thaksin was ousted.  
 
Although the 2007 Constitution after the coup modified the 1997 Constitution, the ECT 
was still retained. However, the appointment process of the commissioners was changed. 
In the 1997 Constitution, the Senate chooses the commissioners from a list prepared by 
the selection committee and the Supreme Court. In contrast, in the 2007 Constitution, 
the Senate only approves the choice of the selection committee and the Supreme Court. 
Thus, the judiciary increased its influence in the appointment process. Of the five new 
ECT commissioners after the 2006 coup, three were judges, one was a prosecutor, and 
one was a university professor  
 
The ECT showed its partisan tendencies against the Thaksin group along with the 
judiciary. The People Power Party (PPP), which succeeded TRT after the Constitutional 
Court dissolved TRT, gained support in rural areas in the 2007 elections.23 Nonetheless, 
the ECT issued yellow cards and red cards mostly to candidates of PPP. As a result, the 
PPP share in the parliament was reduced and became close to that of the Democratic 
Party (Ockey 2008). Although Samak Sundaravej of PPP assumed the premiership, he 
was removed from the office by the Constitutional Court, which claimed that he 
violated the constitution by accepting payments to appear on TV cooking shows while 
in office. Moreover, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of PPP based on 
violations of electoral rules in the 2007 elections (Dressel 2010, Ginsburg 2009).  
 
Surveys indicate that people recognized the ECT’s partisanship. The 2009 Asia 
                                                 
23 In 2007, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of TRT and decided that 
111 TRT members including Thaksin were not eligible for election for five years.  
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Foundation’s report shows that 67 percent of respondents see the ECT as biased (Asia 
Foundation 2009). In the 2010 surveys of the Asia Foundation, the ECT’s integrity 
rating was 42 percent in the South, where anti-Thaksin sentiment is strong, while it was 
25 percent in the North, which is Thaksin’s bailiwick (Asia Foundation 2011). The 
judiciary including the ECT became politically active and revealed their preferences. 
This phenomena is called “Politicization of the Judiciary” (Ginsburg 2009).   
 
 
6. Indonesia 
 
The important factors determining the nature of the Indonesian electoral administration 
are consensus-type political institutions, the party system which reflects social 
cleavages, and the relative weakness of the presidential power.  
 
As for political institutions, especially the electoral system, the president was initially 
elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR)) before the 2004 elections. Even after the direct election was introduced, 
presidential candidates had to be nominated by parties that hold more than 25 percent of 
the vote share or more than 20 percent of the seat share in the lower house. With 
proportional representation for its lower house elections, these institutional frameworks 
favored party coalitions (Kawanaka 2012). The administrations were supported by party 
coalitions of at least five parties during the Megawati Administration and at most seven 
parties during the Abdurrahman Wahid Administration and the first Yudoyono 
Administration. Since parties were institutionalized (cohesive and stable), partisan veto 
players were kept intact. The president cannot buy off members of other parties to join 
his party. In addition, as Kasuya (2013) indicates, the Indonesian president is the 
weakest among seven Asian presidents in terms of veto powers, executive decrees, 
budgetary power, referendum and dissolution of the congress.  
 
These factors lower the stakes of politics and eventually prepare favorable circumstance 
for a neutral electoral administration. In addition, we need to pay attention to the fact 
that some experiences in the initial formation process of electoral administration 
determine the path of further developments. The problem of the partisanship of the first 
election commission in the 1999 elections and the corruption scandal of commissioners 
in 2005 set the direction of reform. It was widely accepted that the electoral 
administration should be free from partisanship and should be monitored to prevent 
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corruption. 
 
In order to keep its neutrality and governance, the Indonesian electoral administration 
comprises various independent organizations, which are mainly the election commission, 
the supervising body, and the ethics committee. However, it took time for the electoral 
administration to become stabilized and capable because the electoral systems have 
been changed frequently since democratization.  
 
The first elections after independence were held in 1955. However, President Sukarno 
suspended elections after he started his authoritarian rule in 1957. Even after President 
Suharto took power in 1965 and resumed elections, elections were strongly controlled 
by the administration. Indonesia adopted proportional representation in the 
post-independent era. The first election commission (Panitia Pemeilihan Indonesia 
(PPI)) was established in 1955 (Rüland 2001). The Suharto Administration established 
the Institute of General Elections (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU)) and placed PPI 
under LPU. LPU was headed by the Minister of Home Affairs and PPI was managed by 
interior bureaucrats and Golkar, a political organization to support the Suharto 
Administration (Haris 2004). Aside from these commissions, the Election Supervisory 
Committee (Panitia Pengawas Pemilu, Panwaslu) was established, but it was also under 
the Minister of Home Affairs and Golkar.  
 
The 1955 elections produced a situation where four major political blocs competed and 
caused stagnation. Under the Suharto regime, the secular groups and the Islamic groups 
were integrated, respectively, and this laid the groundwork for the party system after 
democratization. Various political parties emerged from either the secular bloc or the 
Islamic bloc after 1998. 
 
The electoral administration in the post democratization period was designed to deal 
with political competition within elections and to preclude the ruler’s intervention in 
elections. Actual institutional formation was a process of trial and error. The constitution 
was amended four times from 1999 to 2002. The elections in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 
2014 were held under different electoral systems. As the institutional framework of 
elections changed, the organization of the electoral administration also changed.  
 
Elections after democratization were mainly managed by the General Election 
Commission (Komisi Pemelihan Umum (KPU)) which was established by the 1999 
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General Election Law. The initial composition of the KPU was five commissioners 
recommended by the administration and forty eight commissioners representing 
political parties. This design was intended to prevent the administration’s intervention. 
It was also expected that party representatives in the KPU would watch out for each 
other and neutrality would be achieved. Nonetheless, each commissioner took partisan 
actions individually, and the KPU was not able to function in a neutral way (Harris, 
Wall, and Dahl 2001). 
 
The partisanship of commissioners in the first KPU affected the direction of reform, 
which was to establish neutrality. The third constitutional amendment in 2001 provided 
the KPU as constitutional independent body. Before that, the amendment of the 1999 
General Election Law in 2000 changed the composition of commissioners. The 
commissioners appointed by the government and party representative commissioners 
were abolished. The KPU comprised eleven non-partisan commissioners. The 
appointment process was also clearly defined. The House of Representatives (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)) appoint the commissioners from a list prepared by the 
president. The 2003 amendment of the General Election Law strengthened the 
autonomy of the KPU. Electoral management at the local level was transferred from the 
government to the KPU, and financial autonomy and regulatory power were augmented. 
The KPU members were not allowed to hold any government posts. The relationship 
between the KPU and the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) was also defined. 
The members of Panwaslu were appointed by the KPU, and they were from civic 
organizations, academic society, police and prosecutors (Carter Center 2005). The 
Constitutional Court’s role in elections was also provided in the 2003 Constitutional 
Court Law.  
 
The first direct presidential election was held in 2004, and Yudhoyono won the race. 
Under his administration, the electoral administration was reformed again. The most 
serious impact was exerted by the corruption scandal of the KPU, where two 
commissioners, including the chair, were convicted. The corruption scandal led to the 
strict monitoring of financial management and eventually to inflexibility of fund release. 
The 2007 Election Administration Law again reorganized the KPU. The number of 
commissioners was decreased to seven with five year terms. It was clearly provided that 
commissioners must not hold any government offices or party affiliations. Furthermore, 
the appointment process was revised. Instead of presidential recommendation, the 
president appoints the selection committee which screens the candidates. Based on the 
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committee’s recommendation, DPR decides the commissioners. In addition, the fund 
disbursement process became strictly monitored. Aside from the KPU, the Election 
Supervisory Board (Badan Pengawasan Pemilu, Bawaslu) expanded its power, and the 
Honorary Council of Election Management Bodies (initially Dewan Kehormatan (DK) 
renamed to Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu (DKPP) later) was established. 
Bawaslu investigates the cases of violations of electoral rules based on complaints, 
while DKPP investigates the wrongdoings committed by the members of the KPU and 
Bawaslu (Abdul Gaffar Karim 2014). In sum, the Indonesian electoral administration is 
composed of three organizations: KPU, Bawaslu, and DKPP. The 2009 elections were 
held under this administration, when President Yudhoyono was reelected. 
 
The Indonesian electoral administration developed toward seeking neutrality and 
cleanness.24 However, it suffered from another type of problem. The vast land area and 
the large population size (171.3 million voters and 528,217 precincts in 2009) naturally 
cause inefficiency in electoral management. Moreover, as KPU commissioners were 
strictly required to be non-partisan and to be selected from outside the government, 
most of them were inexperienced and had less knowledge about election management 
(Mietzner 2012, Sukma 2010). The inflexible disbursement process was another cause 
of inefficiency, especially in renewal of the voters list (Khalik 2008). In addition to 
these problems, the 2009 elections were thrown into confusion caused by changes in the 
electoral system in terms of district magnitude and introduction of open list proportional 
representation (Schmidt 2010).25  
 
Also, if we take a look at the local level, the situation was different from the national 
elections. The decentralization introduced by President Habibie and direct elections of 
local chief executives made the stakes of politics larger at the local level. The neutrality 
of the local election commissions was questioned by some observers (Carter Center 
2005).26  
 
                                                 
24 Nonetheless, the corruption scandal of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
in 2013 was another significant occurrence. Akil Mochtar was accused of accepting 
bribery regarding an electoral dispute. He was finally removed from office.  
25 The 2009 elections were seen as being more confusing than the 2004 elections, 
especially in misprinting, undersupply and misdistribution of ballots; delayed 
distribution of election materials; and inaccuracy of voters lists (Rondonuwu and 
Creagh 2009, Sukma 2010). 
26 See also “Editorial: In search of a professional KPU,” Jakarta Post, March 30, 2012. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The electoral administration is crucial in democratic consolidation since people’s 
confidence in elections is the key to legitimacy and stability. This is also true in 
Southeast Asia. This paper investigates the determinants of the nature of electoral 
administrations in the region. We consider the nature of electoral administration as a 
result of strategic interactions between political players, and we emphasize the stakes of 
politics. Through case studies of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, we found that 
the stakes of politics seem to determine the nature of electoral administrations. The 
large stakes in Thailand and the Philippines accentuate the partisan tendencies of the 
election commissions, while the lower stakes in Indonesia result in neutrality. In 
contrast, the expected intensity of protests against electoral fraud or the administration 
seems to have no critical impact in any of the countries. The intensity of protests 
actually reflects the stakes of power. The high stakes enhance protests in Thailand and 
the Philippines.  
 
In addition, the three cases indicate that the neutrality and capacity of electoral 
administrations do not co-vary. The lower capacity and lower neutrality of the electoral 
administration in the Philippines are a result of politicians’ intervention. In Thailand, the 
high capacity of the electoral administration prepares the basis for partisanship since the 
electoral administration plays a crucial role in the electoral process. In Indonesia, lower 
capacity and high neutrality coexist.  
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